Evolutionary Game Analysis of Automakers' Green Production Considering Consumer Environmental Preference and Government Subsidies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6919/ICJE.202609_12(9).0012Keywords:
Evolutionary Game; Green Production; Consumer Environmental Preference; Government Subsidy; Automotive Industry.Abstract
In the context of escalating global environmental pressure, the green transformation of the automotive industry is of vital importance for sustainable development. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a dynamic interaction model of automotive manufacturing enterprises and consumers in green production and consumption decision-making. The research shows: Firstly, consumers' green environmental preferences and government green consumption subsidies are the key factors driving the evolution of both parties' strategies. When consumers' preferences are low and subsidies are insufficient, the system tends towards the traditional production and consumption mode; while when preferences and subsidies both exceed the critical value, the system rapidly converges to a stable state of green production and consumption. Secondly, through simulation analysis, the synergy of high green consumption preferences and high subsidies can significantly accelerate the green transformation process of automotive enterprises and strengthen consumers' green consumption intentions. Moreover, the analysis of the evolution trajectory in the phase plane indicates that in the low parameter scenario, the system's evolution path is smooth, while in the high parameter scenario, although there will be short-term supply-demand imbalance and strategy fluctuations, under the joint effect of policies and the market, the system can successfully overcome the transformation pain period and achieve a stable evolution towards a green equilibrium.
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